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Abstract: 
August Wilson’s The Piano Lesson features a debate between an African American brother and 
sister over the ownership of a richly symbolic piano, a family heirloom that represents the 
Charles family’s slave heritage and its endurance through Reconstruction.  Ownership questions 
like the one presented in The Piano Lesson can usually be resolved in the courts, but Wilson’s 
play suggests that the law might be unable to resolve property disputes so problematically 
entangled with the legacy of slavery.  Wilson offers, instead, a non-legal resolution to the piano 
debate presented in his play. 
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August Wilson’s The Piano Lesson and the Limits of Law 
 
I.  Introduction 
 At the heart of The Piano Lesson, August Wilson’s 1990 Pulitzer Prize-winning play, is a 
debate between an African-American brother and sister over the rightful ownership of a piece of 
property.  The piano sitting in Berniece’s home in Pittsburgh in 1936 has been held by the 
Charles family, or by the white Sutter family, who once owned the Charleses, since 1856, when 
Robert Sutter, a Mississippi plantation owner, traded two Charles family slaves, Mama Berniece 
and her nine-year-old son Walter, for the piano as an anniversary present for his wife Ophelia.  
Soon, however, Ophelia missed the two departed slaves and felt guilty about their sale, perhaps 
because the transaction broke up a functioning slave family.  To assuage Ophelia’s guilt, a 
remaining Sutter slave, Papa Boy Willie, Mama Berniece’s husband and a skilled wood sculptor, 
carved the images of his wife and his son into the frame of the piano.  Papa Boy Willie continued 
to carve into the piano important events from his family’s history—his marriage, his mother’s 
funeral, the birth of his son, the sale of his wife and son.  The piano stayed in possession of the 
Sutter family after emancipation; but on July 4, 1911, Boy Charles, the grandson of the wood 
carver and Berniece’s father, stole the piano from the Sutters.  When Robert Sutter’s son 
discovered the theft, he killed Boy Charles by setting fire to a yellow train boxcar in which Boy 
Charles was hiding.  Berniece took the piano with her when she migrated north from Mississippi 
in 1933.  A widow, Berniece lives in Pittsburgh with her daughter Maretha and her Uncle 
Doaker.  
 The debate between Berniece and her older brother Boy Willie is over the sale of the 
piano.  Boy Willie and his friend Lymon have traveled to Pittsburgh from Mississippi with a 
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truckload of watermelons.  Boy Willie, who claims half ownership of the piano, intends to sell 
the watermelons, convince his sister to sell the piano, combine the newly acquired cash with his 
savings, and buy the piece of Sutter property on which Boy Willie and Berniece’s ancestors 
worked as slaves and sharecroppers.  Berniece wants to retain possession of the piano because 
the instrument holds the Charles family history.  “Money can’t buy what that piano cost,” she 
tells her brother.  “You can’t sell your soul for money.”1 
 Ownership questions like the one presented in Wilson’s play can usually be resolved in 
the courts—by applying relevant property law.  If the piano legally belongs to Berniece, the 
court will likely rule that her brother has no rightful claim upon it.  If the piano is owned jointly 
by Berniece and Boy Willie, the court would likely order Berniece either to pay her brother a fair 
sum of money to purchase his half of the instrument or to sell the instrument and divide the 
proceeds with Boy Willie.2  But Wilson chose not to turn The Piano Lesson into a compelling 
courtroom drama in which Berniece and Boy Willie would present their competing claims to 
judge and jury for resolution.  Indeed, Wilson’s play suggests that it might be unrealistic to 
burden the law with resolving property disputes so problematically entangled with the legacy of 
slavery.  Some other kind of non-legal resolution to the piano debate between Berniece and Boy 
Willie is called for, and Wilson offers playgoers and readers of The Piano Lesson that resolution 
in the final scene of his drama. 
 
II.  Symbols and Meanings 
 Wilson’s piano is one of the most compelling symbols in modern American drama, 
rivaled only, perhaps, by Laura Wingfield’s collection of glass animals in Tennessee Williams’s 
The Glass Menagerie.  Boy Willie cannot understand his sister’s attachment to the piano and her 
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unwillingness to part with the instrument because he fails to understand, or chooses to ignore, the 
piano’s rich symbolic meaning.  For Berniece, the piano embodies more than family history; it 
symbolizes the Charles family’s endurance through slavery and Reconstruction.  “[T]o 
understand about that piano . . . you got to go back to slavery time,” states Uncle Doaker (42), 
who helped his brother Boy Charles steal the piano from the Sutters in 1911.  According to 
Doaker, Boy Charles “never could get it [the piano] off his mind. . . . Say it was the story of our 
whole family and as long as Sutter had it . . . he had us.  Say we was still in slavery” (45).  Boy 
Charles paid for the piano with his life.  His widow, Mama Ola, Berniece and Boy Willie’s 
mother, grasped the meaning of the piano, as Berniece suggests:  “Look at this piano.  Look at it.  
Mama Ola polished this piano with her tears for seventeen years.  For seventeen years she 
rubbed on it till her hands bled.  Then she rubbed the blood in . . . mixed it up with the rest of the 
blood on it.  Every day that God breathed life into her body she rubbed and cleaned and polished 
and prayed over it” (52).  As Harry J. Elam Jr. suggests, “For Berniece, selling the piano would 
desecrate her parents’ memories.”3 
 Boy Willie sees his sister’s attachment to the piano as purely sentimental:  “But I ain’t 
gonna be no fool about no sentimental value.  You can sit up here and look at that piano for the 
next hundred years and it’s just gonna be a piano.  You can’t make it more than that” (51).  He 
boldly asserts his ownership rights to the instrument.  “Berniece ain’t got no more rights to that 
piano than I do,” he tells Uncle Doaker (42).  If Berniece refuses to part with the piano, Boy 
Willie offers a King Solomon solution to their dispute: cut the instrument in half, sell his half, 
and allow his sister to keep the other half in her living room. 
 Though Boy Willie cannot understand the piano’s symbolic value, he certainly possesses 
some intuitive sense of the power of symbols.  For Boy Willie, the hundred acres of land that he 
 4 
wants to purchase from the Sutters is packed with symbolic meaning.  “I’m talking about some 
land,” Boy Willie tells Berniece.  “What you get something out of the ground from. . . . You 
can’t do nothing with that piano up there but sit and look at it” (50).  Later in the play, he 
explains to his sister that land ownership brings empowerment, some sense of equality with 
whites even in the 1930s Jim Crow South:  “If you got a piece of land you’ll find everything else 
fall into place.  You can stand up right next to the white man and talk about the price of cotton . . 
. the weather, and anything else you want to talk about” (92).  Devon Boan is correct when he 
states that acquiring the Sutter property will offer Boy Willie “for the first time in his life, a 
substantial degree of achievement and self-realization.”4  Brent Staples, the New York Times 
columnist whose ancestors were slaves, has written forcefully about what land ownership meant 
to his family members after emancipation:  the “purchase of land” was “a momentous act in the 
lives of former slaves.”5  Staples’s ancestors proudly protected their land with rifles from the Ku 
Klux Klan and others bent on reversing emancipation and the benefits resulting from it. 
 And Boy Willie is not discussing any piece of earth; he is planning to buy a parcel of 
property on which his ancestors were held as human properties.  By purchasing Sutter land, Boy 
Willie will attempt to reverse the curse of slavery and the legacy of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How) 393 (1857), which asserted that “the right of property in a slave is distinctly and 
expressly affirmed in the Constitution.  The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of 
merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every state that 
might desire it.”6  As Stephen M. Best suggests, slavery is not simply an antebellum institution 
whose time has passed; it is “a particular form of an ongoing crisis involving the subjection of 
personhood to property.”7  The year in Wilson’s drama is 1936, and Boy Willie was born a free 
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man, but the scars of slavery remain with the Charles family.  According to Mary L. Bogumil, 
Boy Willie, by purchasing Sutter land, can expunge some of those scars: 
If he acquires that land . . . , it will validate his existence as a free black man and 
put him on the right track, as an owner, not a slave like those ancestors 
represented in the carvings [on the piano].  By acquiring the land from the 
grandson [of Sutter], Boy Willie will psychologically usurp the power of the 
grandfather, the slave master who traded Berniece’s great-grandmother and 
Doaker’s father for the piano.8 
Boy Willie never explicitly articulates the symbolic meaning of Sutter’s land in his debate with 
Berniece, and, as Amadon Bissiri suggests, Boy Willie might not even be fully aware himself of 
the land’s significance; but his burning desire to purchase this particular piece of property signals 
that the Sutter land is, for Boy Willie, more than merely a place to grow crops.9  
 After digesting the arguments of Berniece and Boy Willie, many theatergoers and readers 
of The Piano Lesson might agree with Elam that Wilson “creates convincing and rational 
arguments on both sides of the divide.”10  An early version of the play ended with no resolution 
of the siblings’ debate—because Wilson saw validity in both arguments.11  But audiences who 
saw the early version of The Piano Lesson urged the playwright to provide some resolution of 
Berniece and Boy Willie’s debate.  Lloyd Richards, the Yale Repertory Theatre director with 
whom Wilson worked so closely, convinced Wilson to revise the play’s ending so that audiences 
could leave the theater with closure.12  Wilson’s ending resolved this debate over property 
ownership, but the law does not provide the resolution. 
 
IV.  A Legal Solution 
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 A legal solution to the case of Berniece v. Boy Willie is, of course, theoretically possible.  
If Berniece and Boy Willie had taken their case to court for resolution, the court would be 
empowered to settle the question of ownership.  Both Boy Willie and Berniece make forceful 
moral arguments for controlling the fate of the piano, but whose argument would a court find 
more legally compelling?  Does Berniece own the piano, or do she and her brother share 
ownership rights?  If the siblings share ownership rights, can Boy Willie compel his sister to sell 
the piano so that he can claim his share of its value or to pay him half the fair value of the 
instrument?  Or would the siblings’ arguments be moot in a court of law because the Sutter 
family still retains the ownership rights in a piece of property that was stolen from the Sutter 
home twenty-five years before the time of the play? 
 The general rule at common law is that a thief cannot acquire or transfer title to stolen 
property.13  If that general rule were followed in this case, title to the piano would be in Ophelia 
Sutter, the true owner, or her heirs, and the debate between Boy Willie and Berniece would be 
moot.  There is at common law, however, a well-established exception to this rule, which is that 
a thief’s possessory interest in personal property, after passage of a statutory time period and 
provided certain conditions are fulfilled, can ripen into title, except as against a claim by the true 
owner or someone claiming through the true owner.  A reason for this exception, which protects 
possession, is to preserve the peace: 
A thief does not get complete title, but analysis shows that he does acquire an 
interest which is of some value.  He has possession—that is, physical custody plus 
an intention to exclude all others—and although wrongful, yet if left undisturbed 
for the statutory limitation period, will ripen into a perfect title.  Furthermore, it 
seems that if he is disturbed by anyone except the true owner or one claiming 
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through or on behalf of the latter, his possession will be protected. . . . [N]o good 
reason appears why the well settled rule that possession, even though wrongfully 
acquired, will be protected against trespassers . . . should not apply.  The law 
protects possession to preserve the peace.14 
 
Therefore, at common law, possession of the piano by Boy Charles, the thief, and his heirs was 
protected against anyone in the world except the true owner, Ophelia Sutter, and her heirs.   
 Nothing in the facts of Wilson’s play indicates that Ophelia’s living heirs were asking to 
replevy the piano.  The only member of the Sutter family who shows an interest in the instrument 
is the ghost of the recently deceased James Sutter, Ophelia’s grandson, who has been haunting 
Berniece’s home since his death.  Doaker and Boy Willie believe that the ghost has come to 
Pittsburgh in search of the piano.  “Sutter here cause of that piano,” Doaker tells his brother, 
Wining Boy, who visits Berniece’s home during the course of the play.  “I heard him playing on 
it one time.  I thought it was Berniece but then she don’t play that kind of music.  I come out here 
and ain’t seen nobody, but them piano keys was moving a mile a minute” (57).  Boy Willie tells 
his sister, “Sutter was looking for that piano.  That’s what he was looking for.  He had to die to 
find out where that piano was at” (15).  But James Sutter’s ghost would have no standing in a 
court of law.  Wining Boy clearly intuitively understands this legal principle:  “Sutter dead and 
in the ground . . . [I] don’t care where his ghost is.  He can hover around and play on the piano 
all he want.  I want to see him carry it out of the house.  That’s what I want to see” (58). 
 The doctrine of adverse possession, adopted by many jurisdictions, including 
Pennsylvania, provides that a party can acquire title to a chattel by adverse possession by proving 
hostile, actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of personal property, under 
a claim of right, for a period of time in excess of a statutorily mandated period of years.15  
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Because the location of the piano is Pittsburgh, a relevant Pennsylvania statute applies.16  The 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations for replevin of chattels, in effect at the time of play, provided 
that an action for recovery of personal property must be commenced within six years.17  The 
piano was in the possession of Mama Ola or Berniece from 1911 until the time of the play, 1936.   
According to Doaker, when Boy Charles and his brothers stole the piano on July 4, 1911, they 
immediately brought it to Boy Charles’s wife Mama Ola’s people: 
DOAKER:  . . . [O]n the Fourth of July, 1911 . . . when Sutter was at the picnic 
what the county give every year . . . me and Wining Boy went on down there with 
him and took that piano out of Sutter’s house.  We put it on a wagon and me and 
Wining Boy carried it over into the next county with Mama Ola’s people.  (45) 
  Mama Ola kept the instrument in her possession and “polished this piano with her tears for 
seventeen years” (52), and Berniece took possession of the instrument after her mother’s death.  
She kept it in her exclusive, actual, and continuous possession for more than seven years, thereby 
satisfying the six-year statutorily mandated period of years required for acquisition of title to a 
chattel by adverse possession in Pennsylvania at the time of the play.   
Berniece’s possession of the piano was unquestionably open, notorious, adverse, and 
under claim of title, as she and her relatives openly told the story of how the stolen piano came to 
be in Berniece’s possession.  That Berniece’s possession of and claim of right in the piano were 
open and notorious was further evidenced by the fact that the people in the community knew that 
Berniece had the piano, including a white man who was seeking to purchase musical instruments 
from black folks living in Pittsburgh.  As Boy Willie mentions to Reverend Avery early in the 
play, “Doaker say you sent some white man past the house to look at that piano.  Say he was 
going around to all the colored people’s houses looking to buy up musical instruments” (26).  
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Therefore, the application of the doctrine of adverse possession of chattels to the facts of this 
play would support Berniece’s claim of ownership of the piano, because her possession was 
open, notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous, adverse, and under claim of right for more than 
the six-year statutorily mandated period in effect in Pennsylvania at the time of the play.18 
 Wining Boy and Doaker, Berniece and Willie Boy’s uncles, helped Boy Charles steal the 
piano, but any adverse possession claims to the piano made by Boy Charles’s brothers must be 
dismissed for lack of actual possession for the requisite period of years.  Wining Boy’s and 
Doaker’s claims to the piano are discussed and essentially dismissed during the course of the 
play.  While listening to the piano debate between his niece and nephew, Wining Boy boldly 
asserts his own rights to the piano, an argument that both Boy Willie and Doaker quickly 
dismiss: 
WINING BOY:  Well, I got something to say about that [selling the piano]. 
BOY WILLIE:  This my daddy’s piano. 
WINING BOY:  He ain’t took it by himself.  Me and Doaker helped him. 
BOY WILLIE:  He died by himself.  Where was you and Doaker at then? Don’t 
come telling me nothing about this piano.  This is me and Berniece’s piano.  Am I 
right Doaker? 
DOAKER:  Yeah, you right.  (49) 
Later in the play, Berniece explains that “Doaker don’t want no part of that piano.  He ain’t never 
wanted no part of it.  He blames himself for not staying behind with Papa Boy Charles.  He 
washed his hands of that piano a long time ago.  He didn’t want me to bring it up here—but I 
wasn’t gonna leave it down there” (69).  Doaker dismisses Wining Boy’s claim and concedes 
ownership rights of the piano to his niece and nephew. 
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 Boy Willie asserts partial ownership of the piano, arguing that his father, Boy Charles, or 
his mother, Mama Ola, passed a portion of their possessory rights in the piano to Boy Willie by 
descent or devise.  At common law, Boy Charles, although a thief, could pass his possessory 
rights to his heirs.19  At least three times in the play, Boy Willie claims that half of the piano 
belongs to him.  Early in Act One, Boy Willie asserts, “I’m gonna sell it [the piano].  I own just 
as much of it as she does” (12).  Later in Act One, Boy Willie makes virtually the same 
statement:  “I’m gonna sell it!  Berneice ain’t got no more rights to that piano than I do” (42).  
Later in the same scene, Boy Willie states, “The only thing my daddy had to give me was that 
piano” (46). However, the fact that Boy Charles, after stealing the piano, transported it to his 
wife’s family in the next county, suggests his desire to pass his possessory rights to the 
instrument to his wife, Mama Ola, in the case of his demise, which occurred shortly after the 
theft, when Boy Charles burned to death in a boxcar of the Yellow Dog railroad.  Boy Willie’s 
assertions notwithstanding, Berniece’s description of Mama Ola’s careful polishing of the piano 
and her statement “‘I cleaned it for you, play something for me, Berniece’” (52) are evidence that 
Mama Ola wanted to pass her possessory rights to the piano to her daughter, Berniece, and not to 
her son, Boy Willie.   Because there is no evidence in the play that Boy Charles or Mama Ola 
intended to, nor in fact did, pass rights in the piano to Boy Willie, his claim would most likely 
fail in court against that of his sister Berniece. That he is not—and apparently never has been—
in possession of the piano would be dispositive of a claim by Boy Willie that he had acquired 
partial title to the piano by adverse possession.20 
 
V.  The Limits of Law 
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 For almost 150 years, a nation dedicated to its citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and pursuit 
of happiness has struggled, through its legal system, to deal with the legacy of slavery.  Even 
before the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress established the Freedmen’s 
Bureau to provide food, shelter, jobs, and education to freed slaves.  The Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution attempted to guarantee the freemen’s 
legal rights as citizens and their voting rights.  The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875 attempted 
to make real the guarantees of those two constitutional amendments.  Despite these impressive 
legal efforts, erasing the effects of slavery was problematic, as slavery gave way to Jim Crow, 
which featured legal segregation and lynching without trial.  It is no surprise that freed slaves 
and their descendents rarely looked to the law and the courts to solve their problems.  When they 
turned to the law, as Homer Plessy did in 1892 after his arrest for violating the Louisiana 
Railway Accommodations Act, they often lost. 
 In The Behavior of Law, Donald Black explains that African Americans are less likely 
than whites to use courts of law to solve their problems.  Crimes between black citizens often go 
unreported to authorities; and according to Black, “The same applies in civil . . . matters.  If a 
poor person kills another poor person in an automobile accident, for example, a lawsuit is less 
likely.”21  In the antebellum South, a slave had no legal standing in court, as Dred Scott learned, 
and even second- and third-generation freemen, like the characters in The Piano Lesson, lacked 
confidence in the courts to resolve their disputes or lacked the resources to finance lawsuits.22 
 The characters in Wilson’s play are certainly suspicious of the laws and the courts.  For 
run-ins with the law, Boy Willie, Lymon, Doaker, and Wining Boy have all served time at 
Parchman Farm, the infamous penitentiary work farm in Mississippi.  Lymon, Boy Willie’s 
friend from Mississippi, tells Wining Boy and Doaker that he is running from the law.  After his 
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release from the penitentiary, where he and Boy Willie were sent for stealing firewood, Lymon 
was arrested and sent to jail merely for not working.  “Fined me a hundred dollars,” says Lymon.  
“Mr. Stovall come and paid my hundred dollars and the judge say I got to work for him to pay 
him back his hundred dollars.  I told them I’d rather take my thirty days but they wouldn’t let me 
do that” (37).  During Lymon and Boy Willie’s arrest for stealing firewood, Berniece’s husband 
Crawley was shot to death by the sheriff and his posse.  
 In Act One of The Piano Lesson, Wining Boy shares an anecdote with Boy Willie, 
Lymon, and Doaker that reveals his lack of confidence in the law.  He tells of a black man who is 
caught picking wild berries on unfenced land.  The white man who owns the land tells the sheriff 
to arrest the berry picker for stealing the berries.  Even if the black man buys the land from the 
white man, the white man, according to Wining Boy, can “go and fix it with the law that them is 
his berries.”  Wining Boy concludes his story with the statement, “Now that’s the difference 
between the colored man and the white man.  The colored man can’t fix nothing with the law” 
(38).  Boy Willie responds, “I don’t go by what the law say.  The law’s liable to say anything.  I 
go by if it’s right or not.  It don’t matter to me what the law say.  I take and look at it myself” 
(38-39). 
 Would an ex-convict like Boy Willie sue his sister in court over a piano that was stolen 
from a white man twenty-five years earlier?  Even if he wanted to resolve his case in court, could 
he enlist a lawyer to take the case?  How would he pay the lawyer?  If he wants a favorable 
resolution of his case, Boy Willie would be best advised to avoid the courts and continue to use 
his considerable persuasive skills to convince his sister that she is morally obligated to give him 
a sum of money equal to half of the value of the piano, so that he could use the money to buy 
Sutter’s land.  But Berniece has no money to pay her brother for his claim on the piano.  
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“Berniece ain’t got no money,” Doaker tells Wining Boy.  “She’s having a hard enough time 
trying to get by as it is” (58). 
Since emancipation, the United States legal system has been spectacularly unsuccessful 
in compensating ex-slaves and their descendents with money or property for their years of 
unrequited toil.  The post-Civil War proposal to award former slaves forty acres and a mule to 
commence their lives as freemen was never implemented.  Various compensation schemes, some 
proposed as late as the end of the twentieth century, never received significant support from the 
American citizenry or American politicians.  It seems unrealistic for a late-twentieth-century 
playwright like Wilson to provide a legal solution to resolve the question of the ownership of a 
piano that was traded for two pieces of human property in 1856, stolen by the immediate 
descendents of those slaves from the descendents of their owners more than fifty years later, and 
claimed by the descendents of the thieves.  According to Wilson, law is an ineffective and 
inappropriate means of sorting out the complex property issues at stake in the circumstances that 
he presents in The Piano Lesson. 
 
VI.  Wilson’s Solution:  Wrestling with the Past 
 As noted early in this essay, Wilson felt compelled to provide theatergoers and readers of 
The Piano Lesson with some resolution of the debate at the heart of the drama.  Viewers’ and 
readers’ needs aside, the issue that Wilson raises in his play demands resolution.  The dispute 
over the piano at the center of Wilson’s drama is essentially a debate about how twentieth-
century African Americans should deal with the legacy of slavery.  Should they retain in their 
collective memories the symbols of their special and tragic ancestry, as Berniece might suggest 
by her devotion to the family piano, or should they focus on moving on from slavery and 
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acquiring the economic tools needed to function in the American mainstream, as Boy Willie 
suggests with his quest for land ownership?  Wilson awards Berniece victory in the debate—the 
play ends with Boy Willie giving up his claim on the piano and returning to Mississippi.  But 
even in defeat, Boy Willie has learned a valuable lesson from his family’s piano, for he has 
confronted and debated his tragic heritage and wrestled with the ghosts of the past. 
 Boy Willie senses defeat during the play’s final two scenes as he tries to remove the 
piano from Berniece’s living room so that he can sell it to a purchaser of musical instruments in 
Pittsburgh.  Despite their best efforts, Boy Willie and Lymon cannot budge the piano.  Perhaps 
Wilson is suggesting that Boy Willie’s attempt to rid this symbol of slavery from his family is 
impossible; the burden is simply too heavy to dislodge.  As Boy Willie begins to appreciate the 
futility of his effort, Avery, a local minister, arrives at Berniece’s home to exorcise from the 
premises the ghost of James Sutter, the grandson of the man who ripped apart the Charles family 
by trading Mama Berniece and young Walter for the piano.  As the characters suddenly sense 
Sutter’s presence in Berniece’s home, Boy Willie seems to realize that selling the piano is less 
important than purging his family of Sutter’s ghost.  He turns his attention from the piano and 
rushes upstairs (which is offstage), where Sutter’s ghost seems to be hovering, and commences a 
wrestling match with the spirit.  As Boy Willie grapples with the ghost, Berniece begins to play 
the piano, invoking the names of her slave ancestors as she plays. 
   Boy Willie’s fight with Sutter’s ghost calls to mind Frederick Douglass’s fistfight with 
Mr. Covey, an oppressive slave overseer, in Narrative of the Live of Frederick Douglass, an 
American Slave.  Douglass’s battle with Covey is a key episode in Douglass’s transition from 
slave to man,23 and Boy Willie’s scuffle with Sutter’s ghost plays a similar role in Boy Willie’s 
development.  According to Elam, after Boy Willie vanquishes Sutter’s spirit from his sister’s 
 15 
home, he realizes that “manhood cannot be determined by external acquisition but by internal 
pride, self-definition, and self-determination.”24  Shortly after the fight, a calm comes over 
Berniece’s house, and Boy Willie asks Lymon if he is ready to go home.  “Hey Doaker, what 
time the train leave?” Boy Willie asks his uncle (108). 
 Wilson’s conclusion to the Piano Lesson suggests that resolving property disputes and 
family issues entangled in the legacy of slavery is no easy task for twentieth-century African 
Americans—and it is certainly a problematic task for the American legal system.  Resolving 
these issues involves acknowledging the past; keeping its memory alive through symbols; 
debating those issues, as Berniece and Boy Willie debate the fate of the family piano; and, 
ultimately, wrestling with the ghosts of the past.  That is the piano lesson that Wilson provides 
theatergoers and readers in one of the twentieth-century’s most riveting dramas. 
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